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A Data-Driven Argument in Bioethics: Why Theologically Grounded Concepts
May Not Provide the Necessary Intellectual Resources to Discuss Inequality
and Injustice in Healthcare Contexts
Tomasz _Zuradzki and Karolina Wisniowska
Jagiellonian University
In this paper, we use an innovative, experimental,
and–as yet–rarely applied method in bioethics, namely
corpus analysis, which is commonly used in literature
studies (Moretti 2013), linguistics (Baker 2006), and
has been recently discussed in the context of the his-
tory of ideas (Betti and van den Berg 2016) and phil-
osophy of science (Pence and Ramsey 2018).1 In
contrast to other areas of experimental philosophy,
which typically involve surveying folk participants with
questionnaires aimed at eliciting their intuitions, our
method here connects distant reading (a quantitative
approach to the large corpus within Christian bioeth-
ics) with close reading (qualitative analysis of selected
documents or their fragments with the word “dignity”)
of scholarly papers. By demonstrating the ambiguity of
the concept of dignity discernible when analyzing its
use in normative contexts, our work is a novel contri-
bution to the debates among the historians of ideas
about conceptual identity and conceptual drift.
Concerned that theological and secular bioethicists
have drifted apart, McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier
(2020) claim that “questions of inequality and injust-
ice within bioethics informed by a Christian anthro-
pology” (5) may become a fertile ground for
reestablishing the connection between these two
camps. In particular, the authors believe that the con-
cepts of dignity, sin, and the common good—because
of their emphasis on “the relational dimension of
individuals”—may be informative for secular bioethics
and may become points of “dialogue for religious and
secular thinkers” which “reframe the conversation”
(11) around some critical issues in the health sciences.
We disagreed with McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier
(2020) proposal, hypothesizing that the way these
three concepts actually function systematically within
the current Christian anthropology excludes them
from being any “dialogical framework.” The lack of
space in this commentary article does not allow us to
CONTACT Tomasz _Zuradzki t.zuradzki@uj.edu.pl Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy & Interdisciplinary Centre for Ethics, Jagiellonian
University, ul. Grodzka 52, Krakow 31-044, Poland.
1Surprisingly, the method has not been mentioned in any of the 12 papers in a special issue entitled “Fostering Dialogue about Empirical and Normative
Bioethics” published recently by AJOB Empirical Bioethics.
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discuss all three concepts thoroughly, so we have
decided to present a data-driven argument concerning
only the concept of dignity, understood by the
Authors as “the inherent equality endowed to all of us
by God” (6). While not questioning the definition
itself, we hypothesized, against the Authors’ claim,
that within contemporary Christian bioethic thought,
the concept of dignity does not (at least systematic-
ally) recall the relational dimension (“one’s dignity is
intimately bound to the other,” 9) and does not have
the normative function that the Authors
have assumed.
By the normative function of a concept, we mean
the ways in which the grasping (or possession of)
some concepts are entangled with being disposed to
make certain evaluative judgments (Fredericks 2018).
In our understanding, some concepts are parts of
complex conceptual frameworks (Betti and van den
Berg 2014) containing, among other elements, evalu-
ative judgments. This fragment of Evangelium Vitae,
in which the normative function of the concept of
dignity is used to condemn some kind of scientific
experiments, exemplifies our point: “the use of human
embryos or fetuses as an object of experimentation
constitutes a crime against their dignity as human
beings who have a right to the same respect owed to a
child once born, just as to every person” (John Paul II
1995). We believe our understanding fits with the
McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier (2020) perspective
who write that concepts may “encourage dialog” or
“self-reflection and self-critique,” and while discussing
the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human
Rights, they even recognize dignity as “a concept that
requires actions.” They seem to assume that there is a
connection between grasping (or possession of) the
concept of dignity and being disposed to evaluate
some states or prescribe some action.
METHODS
For the purpose of writing this commentary article,
we assumed that the meaning of the concept
expressed by the word “dignity” in Christian bioethics
may be established by means of systematic analyses of
scholarly papers. To test our hypothesis, we have
identified a corpus: we reviewed all 283 scholarly jour-
nals classified by the Louvain Index of Theology and
Religious Studies for Journals (LITARS 2020) as IJ1
(“absolute top-class journals”) and IJ2 (“important
journals that have a little less international reso-
nance”), and for the full-text analyses we chose jour-
nals that have published the highest number of
articles with the term “dignity” since 2010 (for exclu-
sions see the Supplementary materials). Then, we sys-
tematically browsed the full-text of 4,177 texts
published since 2010 in 5 Anglo-American scholarly
journals with a specialization (or with the particular
interests) in Christian ethics/bioethics that have pub-
lished the highest number of articles with the term
“dignity”: Theological Studies (239 papers with the
word “dignity” since 2010), Studies in Christian Ethics
(187), Journal of Religious Ethics (141), Christian
Bioethics (126), Modern Theology (116). Finally, we
qualitatively analyzed all 809 journal papers in which
the word “dignity” appeared, excluding 556 texts (edi-
torials, book reviews, etc.; for details see the
Supplementary materials). Obviously, we are aware of
some shortcomings of our analyses, for example,
because of time-consuming qualitative analyses we
could approach a limited number of papers2; our
search method excluded non-English articles; the
exclusion of books or non-scholarly popular publica-
tions (because of no comprehensive databases).3
RESULTS
As a result of our analysis, we have distinguished
between three relevant ways in which the concept of
dignity has been used in normative contexts (i.e. giv-
ing practical recommendations). An individualistic
approach is a traditional stance, at least since Vatican
II, with a strong emphasis on prohibitions against
abortion, assisted reproductive technologies, embryo
research, same-sex parenting, physician-assisted sui-
cide, and euthanasia. A solidarity approach is similar
to the one used by McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier
(2020) with the emphasis on the rise of economic
inequalities and the problem of poverty as well as the
Christian feminist understanding of this concept (this
perspective often appears also in connection to rela-
tions with nature and other species). Finally, a secular
approach is the usage after legal texts in secular states,
secular philosophers’ views as well as the colloquial
usage (for representative papers for every approach
see the Supplementary materials).
In our analysis, 80 articles (32%) leaned toward an
individualistic perspective, 116 (46%) toward a soli-
darity perspective (8 of those (7%) were focused
mainly on species dignity) and as many as 46 (18%)
2We are aware that it is possible to use some automatic corpus analyses,
see, for example, Macroscope, a web-tool for examining the structure of
language based on the English Google Ngram Book corpus, Li et al. 2019,
which has its own shortcomings.
3We plan to present a broader analysis and overcome at least some of
these shortcomings in our forthcoming work.
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articles discussed a secular approach. We categorized
11 (4%) articles as “between approaches” (when both
individualistic and solidarity approaches were rele-
vant). A solidarity approach is slightly more popular
than the individualistic one, although in some ana-
lyzed texts it happens to be depicted as margin
(Brittain 2014). What is more, authors who prefer a
solidarity approach often present their ideas as con-
trasting with the current official doctrine of the
Roman Catholic Church, emphasizing their critique
toward it (Salzman and Lawler 2013).
From the diachronic perspective (Figure 1), our
data show some signs of conceptual drift related to
the pontificate of Pope Francis, as some authors have
suggested (Engelhardt 2015). Before 2015,4 a solidarity
approach appeared in about 35% texts included in our
in-depth analysis, after 2015 it was 54%—especially
Pope Francis’ critique on economic inequality and his
stance on climate change were commented on. At the
same time, an individualistic perspective remains
important within the analyzed journals, but its usage
has declinedfrom 42% before 2015 to 24% after 2015.
More than 18% of the articles focused only on secular
perspective what may suggest that many theologians
draw from secular bioethics.
There are significant discrepancies between jour-
nals. In Christian Bioethics only 24% of considered
articles leaned toward a solidarity perspective, in
Studies in Christian Ethics—29%, compared to 73% in
Theological Studies, 65% in Journal of Religious Ethics
and 44% in Modern Theology. An individualistic per-
spective is represented in 55% of the analyzed texts in
Christian Bioethics and in 35% in Studies in Christian
Ethics, but only in 13% in Theological Studies and
Journal of Religious Ethics and 11% in
Modern Theology.
DISCUSSION
Our findings are crucial for the interpretation of
McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier (2020) central thesis
because we clearly demonstrate that the concept of
dignity, as most of the concepts used by the science
or the humanities, is not a static entity that remains
identical through time and is not unanimously under-
stood by scholars even within one domain. Initially,
we assumed that the “solidarity” approach is in the
minority within the current Christian bioethical
Figure 1. Percentage of articles per year representing two main approaches to the concept of dignity (based on 253 analyzed
texts containing the word “dignity” published since 2010 in five selected Christian scholarly journals). AN INDIVIDUALISTIC
APPROACH—a traditional stance toward dignity, at least since Vatican II, with a strong emphasis on prohibitions against abortion,
assisted reproductive technologies, embryo research, same-sex parenting, physician-assisted suicide, and euthanasia. A SOLIDARITY
APPROACH—a relational stance toward dignity with a strong emphasis on the problem of economic inequalities and poverty;
includes Christian feminist views; this perspective often appears also in connection to relations with nature and other species. A
SECULAR APPROACH and BETWEEN APPROACHES are not included in this figure.
4The year 2015 is optimal as a threshold, as Pope Francis’ pontificate
started 13th March 2013, and taking into consideration the amount of
time researchers need to write, as well as waiting time for a publication
in journals.
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anthropology. Although this hypothesis has not been
confirmed by our in-depth analyses of selected jour-
nals, our results show that Christian anthropology may
be currently divided almost half-half in the understand-
ing of the concept dignity between an individualistic
and solidarity approaches. Moreover, even though only
a minority of papers focused solely on a secular per-
spective, about 32% of in-depth analyzed articles in
Christian antropology also invoked a secular approach
to the concept of dignity, often as a reference point for
a discussion of one of the theological understandings
(in this case a paper has been classified as accepting
either individualistic or solidarity approach).
All of these are problematic in the context of
McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier (2020) central thesis.
The use of the word “dignity” in Christian bioethics
journals shows that the concept of dignity is a
“concept constellation” composed of many main ele-
ments or aspects (individual, solidarity, secular), only
one of which (solidarity) is used by the Authors. To
use any such theological concept to encourage dia-
logue with secular bioethics, it may be necessary to do
justice to all these elements or aspects that compose a
core of the concept (in a sense defined by Kuukkanen
2008). Therefore, our view is that before any attempts
are made to reestablish the connection between theo-
logical and secular bioethics based on the concept of
dignity, a significant concept change within Christian
anthropology itself should occur: in the case of dignity,
a solidarity sense which is currently only one of the
main ways of understanding this concept in Christian
bioethics should become its sole core (for more on the
methods of modeling of conceptual change see: Betti
and van den Berg 2014). At this moment, using this
conceptual tool of Christian anthropology to engage
meaningfully with secular bioethics concerns may be at
least difficult, if not impossible.
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